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Battle: The Validity of Conditional Zoning: A Florida Perspective

NOTE
THE VALIDITY OF CONDITIONAL ZONING:
A FLORIDA PERSPECTIVE*
INTRODUCMON

In the mid-nineteen twenties the Supreme Court conclusively established
that zoning is within the ambit of the state police power.' All fifty states have
properly delegated this authority to their political subdivisions 2 and local
governmental units have been encouraged to plan for optimum land development through creation of land-use districts. 3 More than ninety-seven percent
of all cities in the United States have enacted some type of zoning ordinance
pursuant to a state enabling act. 4 These acts allow local governments to
divide the land into districts according to classification of uses to be permitted
therein. Generally, regulation of the classes of uses permitted in any one district
must be uniform within that district but may vary from district to district.-'
Under ideal "Euclidean zoning",' rigid symmetry would prevail with homogeneous uses being permitted within each class of district to the exclusion
7
of all non-conforming uses.
Because the simplistic pattern created by traditional Euclidean zoning
cannot encompass the universe of land uses envisioned by modern society, ac*EDITOR'S NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the Summer 1979 quarter.
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding zoning valid
against constitutional attack). See generally R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (1968);
N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW, LAND USE, AND THE POLICE POWER (1974).
2. See N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8.
3. See generally Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973). See also Comment, The Use and Abuse
of Contract Zoning, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 897 (1965).
4. See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 692 (noting that of U.S. cities with populations of
over 250,000 only Houston, Texas, has not enacted a zoning ordinance).
5. See, e.g., STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1924); FLA. STAT. §§163.160-.3211 (1975).
See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 1.
6. This term comes from the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), which upheld against constitutional attack a zoning scheme based upon
division of the zoning authority's jurisdiction into districts according to the classes of uses
permitted therein. This early scheme of land-use control, dubbed "Euclidean zoning", has
served as the model for the vast majority of zoning ordinances to date. See generally R.
ANDERSON, supra note 1. See also C. RATHKOPF & A. RATIIKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING (1960).
7. See Comment, note 3 supra. Cf. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT §2 (1924) (requiring uses within a single zoning district to be homogeneous and all districts to be uniform). See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 1. During the gestation period of Euclidean
Zoning, proponents of zoning viewed the tendency of zoning ordinances to be discriminatory
as a major constitutional hurdle. Comprehensive districting was viewed as a method of avoiding this problem and this rigid symmetry was sought to be imposed in the ordinances. R.
ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§1.14-.16, 3.07-.10.
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commodation of the peculiar needs of a community requires a multivarious
population of use districts." In communities undergoing rapid economic and
industrial development, the Euclidean system is unwieldy and unresponsive
to the immediate needs of its citizensY Zoning authorities have traditionally
sought to supply flexibility through extensive utilization. of variances and
special exceptions.o These devices, however, were designed to avoid unconstitutional rigidity in zoning ordinancesl and have proved to be ill-suited
to the task of converting the inflexible mold of Euclidean zoning into a
12
flexible land-use regulatory scheme.
8.

See Kennedy, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility, 23

HASrINcs L.J. 825, 826 (1972); Comment, supra note 3, at 897.
9. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 826; Comment, supra note 3, at 897.
10. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 1 §§17.08, 18.01, 18.02, 19.01, 19.02; Henning, Land
Use -

Goffinet v. County of Christian: New Flexibility in Zoning Law, 8 Loy. L. Rzv. 642,

650-51 (1977); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 827. A variance is an administrative flexibility device
granted solely upon the basis of an unnecessary hardship created by a zoning ordinance.
The hardship must be due to special conditions or circumstances peculiar to that parcel
which do not result from actions of the owner. A variance must be consistent with the general
intent and purpose of the ordinance, must not confer upon the owner any special privilege
not enjoyed by others in the district, and must be the minimum variance consistent with
allowing a reasonable use at the property. See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 1; C.
RATHKOPE &

A.

RATHKOPF,

supra note 6; E.

YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND

PRAcncE (1948).

Another form of administrative relief, the special exception, must be specifically
enumerated in the zoning ordinances and is granted only when certain conditions are not.
See R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §5.17.
11. See C. RATHKoPr & A. RATHKOPF, supra note 6, 37-41.
12. See E. YoRatay, supra note 10, at 324. For a detailed judicial discussion of the role of
special exceptions and variances, see Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 170 Cal.
App. 2d 610, 339 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1969).
Many jurisdictions prohibit the granting of a variance which establishes, or permits
expansion of, a nonconforming use. See, e.g., Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957) ;
FLA. STAT. §§163.170, 163.225 (1978). A nonconforming use is defined as a use ". . . not
generally or by special exception permitted in the zoning district involved or any use expressly or by implication prohibited by the terms of the ordinance in the zoning district."
FLA. STAT. §163.225(3)(d) (1978). Thus, where use variances are prohibited and a desirable
use is not allowed by the ordinance, variances are of dubious value in tailoring the zoning
classification to the unique demands of the parcel. The only alternative remaining is a
zoning amendment. But where other adjacent properties are not also suitable for the use,
rezoning is probably not justified.
In addition to their limited flexibility variances are an administrative form of relief
granted by an appointed zoning board of adjustment. More than one study indicates that
these boards fail as an institution to accomplish their intended purpose. See Dukeminier &
Stapelton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273 (1962).
See also Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power -Constructive
in Theory, Destructive in

Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3 (1969). Shapiro argues that these boards often abuse their discretion by granting variances on the basis of the members' personal conceptions of the
board's function. Id. at 18.
Special exceptions are similarly ill-suited for providing the required flexibility in the
regulation of land-use in changing communities. This is primarily due to the requirement
that all permissible exceptions be enumerated in the ordinance creating the use district,
see R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §5.17, because special exceptions are granted by a zoning
board of adjustment which, being an administrative board, must be supplied with specific
guidelines by which to make their decisions. See, e.g., State ex rel Palm Beach Jockey Club
v. Florida State Racing Com., 158 Fla. 335, 28 So. 2d $30 (1946).
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Recently many local governments seeking flexibility in land-use regulation
have experimented with attaching conditions to zoning ordinances.' 3 The
practice is generally referred to as conditional zoning 4 and constitutes an
attempt to individualize land-use regulation within the framework of traditional Euclidean zoning. While this approach appears to be a viable means
of accomplishing a degree of flexibility in land-use controls, 15 it has been
attacked on several grounds.' 0 This note will analyze the arguments for and
against conditional zoning, briefly survey the jurisdictions which have addressed
the issue,'7 and examine the status of Florida law in the area.' 8
CONDITIONAL ZONING: CRITICISMS

Since individualization, the hallmark of conditional zoning, runs contrary
to notions of uniformity underlying traditional zoning schemes, conditional
zoning lends itself to attack on several grounds. The first, and possibly the
most troublesome, of these challenges is that conditional zoning constitutes
contract zoning.
CONDITIONAL OR CONTRACT?

Opponents of the practice of attaching conditions to zoning ordinances
typically advance identical arguments against conditional zoning and a similar
but distinctly different practice, entitled contract zoning. Inquiry into the
validity of conditional zoning is complicated by an indiscriminate judicial use
of the two terms which underlies the confusion surrounding their actual disIn addition, special exceptions are theoretically available to all parcels within the use
district to which they are applicable. Many jurisdictions hold that if a petitioner meets
the requirements of the zoning ordinance for granting of the exception, the burden shifts
to the city to establish that the exception, if granted, would be detrimental to the health,
safety and general welfare of the public. See, e.g., Hall v. Korth, 244 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1971). Once applicants for special exception establish that they meet conditions for
a special exception, the "fairly debatable" rule no longer applies and burden shifts to zoning
authority to establish that exception should not be granted. This often results in the focus
being directed to the adverse effects of the proposed use upon surrounding properties rather
than upon remedial conditions under which the use might be allowed and on any potentially
beneficial aspects of the use to the community. In this view, FLA. STAT. §163.225(3)(a) (1978)
requires that: "In order to authorize any variance from the terms of the ordinance, the
board of adjustment must find: . . . (6) . . . that such variance will not be injurious to
the area involved or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare."
13. See R. ANDERSON supra note 1, §9.20; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 827; Comment,
supra note 3, at 897.
14. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §9.20; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 827; Comment,
supra note 3, at 897.
15. Conditional zoning allows zoning authorities on a case-by-case basis, to exact promises
or conditions from the landowner to ameliorate any adverse effects of the proposed use on
adjacent properties. Thus, proposed uses can be evaluated on their individual merits with
focus on the specific parcel in question and the land-use regulations can be tailored to that
parcel.
16. See notes 31-96 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 31-162 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 163-209 infra and accompanying text.
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tinctions1 9 These terms are descriptive rather than legal and the distinctions
in their meanings are crucial to any inquiry concerning the validity of the
20
concepts they represent.
Properly understood, conditional zoning refers to a situation in which the
zoning authority obtains the property owner's commitment to subject the
property to certain regulations or conditions as a prerequisite to approval of
a rezoning petition.21 A valid basis for the rezoning must exist independent
of the conditions imposed 22 and the zoning authority may not be bound in
contract or otherwise to rezone the property. 23 The conditions may assume a
variety of forms such as deed restrictions, 24 permissive uses25 or requirements
for buffer zones and open space areas. 26
By, contrast, contract zoning refers to the undertaking of reciprocal obligations with respect to a zoning amendment by a property owner and the
19. See Henning, supra note 8, at 644; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 826; Comment, supra
note' 3,'at 897.
20. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper these terms will be defined at the outset.
See notes 23-31 infra and accompanying text.
21., See Shapiro, The Case for ConditionalZoning, 41 TEMp. L.Q. 267, 270-71 (1968). This

might be considered as a unilateral contract. But if a second rezoning became justified, the
zoning authority could proceed without the sanction of a suit for breach of contract because
any such contract would presumably be void as against public policy. See Buchoiz v. Omaha,
174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963). The Bucholz court stated that ,breach of conditions
to a zoning ordinance could not provide the basis for a second rezoning and that public
policy would preclude an interpretation which could obligate the city to retain a zoning
classification. Id. at 864, 120 N.W.2d at 272-73. Assuming this to be the case, the question
arises whether the owner might not breach the conditions after obtaining the desired
zoning and invoke this rationale to defeat the zoning authority enforcement of the conditions. Such an approach would allow the property owner to claim a prior existing nonconforming use and leave the zoning authority without remedy. However this eventuality is
precluded by the existence of provisions, in most enabling acts, giving statutory authority
to zoning officials to bring suit for judicial enforcement of zoning ordinances and regulations.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §163.305. Presumably these include conditions imposed upon variances
and special exceptions and would similarly include conditions attached to zoning ordinances.
Therefore, the zoning body would not be dependent upon a contract theory to enforce the
conditions.
22. Thus the zoning would be proper without the conditions. See, e.g., Church v. Islip,
8 NY.2d 254, 256, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (1960) (New York Court of
Appeals upheld a conditional zoning ordinance on this reasoning).
There is generally no entitlement to a particular zoning classification. See generally R.
ANDMnSON, supra note 1. The burden is upon the zoning petitioner to establish beyond all
fair debate that he is entitled to a particular zoning classification. See Oka v. Cole, 145 So.
2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1956). The mere fact that a particular zoning classification might be
valid does not in itself give rise to a requirement that it be granted. The only requirement is that it be fairly debatable that the classification granted is valid. Id.
23. See generally materials cited notes 7 & 8 supra.
24. See, e.g., Church v. Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680. 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960)
(zoning ordinance conditioned upon owner recording deed restrictions limiting use of
property).
25. Bayles v. Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959). The ordinance in Bayles
changed the use classification of the property involved and limited uses to those specifically
permitted by that classification.
26. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (requiring a buffer strip, bay-point wall
-and certain open space requirements).
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zoning authority. 27 An enforceable promise to perform the act is given by
the property owner to the zoning authority as consideration for rezoning the
property and the zoning authority is bound in contract to exercise the zoning
power pursuant to the agreement.28 Although the landowner's promise may
be related to the proposed use, it is not required by the land-use classification
sought and often forms the basis of the zoning amendment." The determinative features of contract zoning are: (1) the exercise of the zoning power pursuant to an express bilateral contract between the property owner and the
zoning authority; and (2) the lack of a valid basis, independent of the
contract, upon which to justify the zoning amendment.30
Due to the contractual element present in contract zoning it is censured as
violative of two zoning canons which prohibit preferential treatment of private interests and require that zoning ordinances remain subject to change. 31
The first canon is violated by any practice which allows each citizen to be
governed by individual rules based upon the best deal he can negotiate with
the government. 32 The second is violated by any agreement which restricts
the zoning authority's power to zone or rezone.33 Where the zoning authority
contracts to zone it may be argued that the petitioner would be entitled to
injunctive relief upon any future attempt by the authority to rezone his
parcel.3 4 Therefore, an agreement of this type would constitute an invalid
35
surrender of the power to govern.
27. These obligations give rise to an express bilateral contract between the zoning
authority and the property owner. See generally Comment, supra note 3.
28. Theoretically, specific enforcement might be available to the property owner where
the zoning authority breached the agreement. The argument would be that the petitioner
had no adequate remedy at law where his proposed use was disallowed.
29. Where the conditions form the sole consideration for the zoning amendment it may
be argued persuasively that the zoning is improper because it lacks a valid basis. This
rationale was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86,
89 (Fla. 1956).
30. See Henning, supra note 10, at 644.
31. The substance of this criticism is that the power to govern has been surrendered
to private interests. See, e.g., State ex rel Zupahcic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 28, 174 N.W.2d
533, 537 (1970) "A contract made by a zoning authority to zone or rezone or not to zone is
illegal and the ordinance is void because a municipality may not surrender its governmental
powers and functions or thus inhibit the exercise of its police or legislative powers". Id. See
also Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prod. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 127, 129, 87 A.2d 319,
321 (1952).
32. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956), stating that if a governing body
can legislate via contract, "each citizen would be governed by an individual rule based upon
the best deal he could make with the governing body". Id. See also Comment, supra note 3,
at 903. It may be argued that where contract zoning is permitted the wealthy and politically
influential will be able to buy the zoning they desire leaving the less affluent to take "pot
luck" in zoning requests. Several studies indicate that this result already attends the granting
of variances and special exceptions. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 12, at 17, 23; Dukeminier &
Stapelton, supra note 12, at 325. See also Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations and
Neighborhood Decline in Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 470, 472 [hereinafter Neighborhood
Decline in Illinois] (suggesting that illegal variances are a product of the venality of politics).
33. See Henning, supra note 10, at 645.
34. Id. This argument has also been addressed by Shapiro, supra note 21, at 270. See
also R. ANDERSON supra note 1, §8.21.
35. See Shapiro, supra note 34, at 270. See also Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive
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Many of the criticisms of conditional zoning reflect concerns that the
zoning authority's judgment may be affected by improper considerations, or
that discretionary authority to negotiate conditions may lead to official misconduct. 6 Such fears were apparent in City of Knoxville v. Ambristler.37 In
Ambristler, the zoning petitioner agreed to maintain a strip of land as a park
and to dedicate it to the city upon demand 3 s Thereupon the city rezoned the
remainder of the parcel containing the strip to an apartment use classification.
In reviewing an action by the city to force the petitioner to dedicate the strip,
the Tennessee Supreme Court held the agreement void as against public
39
policy.
The Ambristler court relied heavily upon Osborne v. Allen- which invalidated a similar agreement between the state road department and a
property owner. But the Osborne case involved the offer of a cash donation
in return for the location of a proposed highway along a route contiguous to
the property owner's farm.41 The Osborne court found that such agreements
were void as against public policy due to the extreme opportunity for undue
influence. 42 Recent case law makes it clear that Tennessee courts remain uncomfortable with such agreements. 4 3
Not all jurisdictions exhibit the same degree of concern over the possibility
of official misconduct. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, has
taken another approach. In State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane,44 a rezoning
petitioner agreed to pay $75,000 toward highway improvements in return for
approval of a rezoning petition changing the classification of his property
from residential to commercial. The court held that a conditional zoning
ordinance is valid if it has a legitimate basis and there is no evidence of a
"bargain and sale" of the zoning power.45
Prod. Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 127, 87 A.2d 319 (1952); State ex rel Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis.
2d 22, 28, 174 N.W.2d 533, 537 (1970).
36. See Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REV. 121 (1963). Trager suggests that the
courts' anxiety over improper action by local officials is an underlying reason for all of
the arguments posed against conditional zoning. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 903.
37. 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953).
38. Id. at 5, 263 S.W.2d at 529. The city was given a fifty year period within which to
make the demand.
39. Id. at 8, 263 S.W.2d at 530.
40. 143 Tenn. 343, 226 S.W. 221 (1920).
41. Id., at 355, 226 S.W. at 223.
42. Id. at 354, 226 S.W.2d at 222. Thus Ambristler as precedent against conditional
zoning is weakened by its reliance on Osborne. Id.
43. In Haymon v. Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1973) a covenant to maintain a
buffer strip between a proposed apartment complex and adjoining property had been
exacted from the developer. A newly appointed board of adjustment granted the developer's
successor in interest a waiver and later revoked it upon discovery of the covenant. The
entire agreement was struck down on the basis that contracts made for the purpose of
unduly controlling official conduct are void as against public policy.
44. 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
45. Id. at 216, 422 P.2d at 796. The $75,000 was for highway improvements necessitated
in part by the proposed project.
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A similar result was reached in Maryland where the zoning petitioner and
the planning commission entered a covenant for the donation of a park by
the petitioner conditioned upon the zoning authority's rezoning of the petitioner's property to a medium density apartment classification. 4 6 The court,
however, expressly noted that the planning commission and not the zoning
authority was a party to the covenant,4 7 thereby indicating that the court was
not as concerned by the opportunity for undue influence and misconduct
where the legislative body of the municipality is not involved in negotiating
4s
the conditions.
In light of the discretion vested in governmental bodies which review applications for building permits, special exceptions and subdivision approval,
the fear of misconduct and undue influence in some jurisdictions is perplexing.49 It is difficult to discern why these concerns are more offensive where
the exercise of discretion relates to zoning rather than to one of these alternative methods of land-use regulation. Presumably, a conditional zoning
ordinance is subject to the same reasonableness requirement demanded of any
50
exercise of the police power.
In the most recent Washington case on point, Redmond v. Kezner, 10 Wash. App. 332,
517 P.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1973), the court stated that conditional zoning ordinances are valid
unless it clearly appears that there is no valid reason for the rezoning and that the ordinance
is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. Washington zoning authorities have considerable discretion in imposing conditions upon zoning ordinances where a valid basis for the zoning
exists. Therefore in Washington the burden of establishing invalidity of such ordinances is
clearly upon the one challenging them. Cf. Oka v. Cole, 145 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1962) (reaffirmed the "fairly debatable" rule in Florida which places the burden on one challenging
a zoning ordinance to establish that it is beyond fair debate that the ordinance is proper).
See note 60 infra.
46. See City of Greenbelt v. Bressler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967); accord Pressman
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379, (1959).
47. 248 Md. at 212, 236 A.2d at 3. The planning commission is an appointed board
which studies a rezoning petition and recommends approval or denial. The zoning authority
is an elected legislative body which approves or disapproves such petitions and is not bound
by the planning commission's recommendation.
48. Id. at 210, 236 A.2d 1. The city was held entitled to specific performance under
agreement between planning commission and developer under which developer agreed to
donate a park in consideration of a favorable recommendation of its zoning petition. The
agreement was also conditioned upon favorable action by the zoning authority which had
rezoned the property in reliance on the planning commission's recommendation. Contra,
Baylis v. Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959) (agreement between zoning authority
and developer invalidated).
49. In exercising their power to condition special exceptions, variances and subdivision
approvals, local governments routinely negotiate the terms of the conditions imposed. See
Dukeminier & Stapelton, supra note 12, at 325; Shapiro, supra note 12, at 17, 23; Comment,
supra note 3, at 903. See also FLA. STAT. §163.225(2)(c)-(3)(d) (1978) (expressly granting zoning
boards of adjustment authority to impose reasonable conditions upon granting variances and
special exceptions).
50. However, it may be argued that the low level of scrutiny provided upon review and
the burden of proof placed upon one who challenges zoning ordinances effectively precludes
judicial policing of such exercises of discretion. See note 45 supra and notes 60 and 69
infra. Also see Neighborhood Decline in Illinois, supra note 32, at 472, suggesting that judicial
policing has failed to eliminate undue influence upon such boards.
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SPOT ZONING
Since conditional zoning attempts to individualize traditional zoning classifications by focusing upon the unique problems of a specific parcel for which
rezoning is sought, it has also been condemned as spot zoning.51 Spot zoning
is disfavored procedurally because a particular landowner is singled out for
preferential treatment. 52 Thus, in conditional zoning cases where the focus of
a zoning petition approval may appear to shift exclusively to the qualities of
a particular landowner's property, it has been argued that the successful peti53
tioner has received preferential treatment.
Substantively, spot zoning has been condemned as adverse to two tenets of
zoning which require, respectively, uniformity within individual use classification districts5 4 and conformity with a comprehensive plan.55 Although it has
been persuasively argued that varying conditions and regulations on different
parcels within the same use district is the antithesis of Euclidean zoning,56
complete conformity with the comprehensive plan and absolute uniformity
within districts is not necessary. 57 For example, in Oka v. Cole,-5 the Florida
Supreme Court, faced with a claim of spot zoning, held that lack of strict
51. See A. RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING 74-113 (1972). The creation of
a small "island" of nonconforming uses within a district is the classifical definition of spot
zoning. See, e.g., Parking Facilities, Inc. v. Miami Beach, 88 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1956) (use of
portion of parking garage building within a multi-family district for stores would destroy
character of the neighborhood and constitute spot zoning). With the advent of the comprehensive plan this definition is easily extended to zoning made contrary to the plan. Such
an argument was accepted by a Florida court in the early case of State ex rel. Henry v.
Miami, 117 Fla. 594, 158 So. 82 (1934).
52. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 51 at 74-9 (1972). See, e.g., Reskin v. Northlake, 55 Ill.
App. 2d 184, 189, 204 N.E.2d 600, 603 (App. Ct. 1965); State ex tel. Henry v. Miami, 117
Fla. 594, 158 So. 82 (1934). "Spot zoning" is also used to refer to zoning which is inconsistent
with general provisions of an overall ordinance or prevailing use in the area rezoned and
is said to be universally condemned. See, e.g., Parking Facilities, Inc. v. Miami Beach, 88
So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1956).
53. The real focus is upon unique qualities of the zoning petitioner's property and the
adverse effects the proposed use may have upon surrounding properties. Once the zoning
authority determines that the petitioner's proposed use is desirable an attempt can be
made to draft an ordinance which allows the use while ameliorating any adverse effects. If
on balance the authority finds that the use, as restricted, is in the best interests of the
general public, the ordinance is passed; if not, it is defeated. Most state enabling acts require
that a similar balancing of interests be made by a zoning board of adjustment prior to granting a variance. E.g., FLA. STAT. §163.225(3) (1978). However, a substantial burden is placed
upon the petitioner to establish that he is entitled to a variance. See, e.g., Josephson v.
Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784, 787 (Fla. 1957); Reskin v. Northlake, 55 IlL. App. 2d 184, 189, 204
N.E.2d 600, 603 (App. Ct. 1965).
54. See Comment, supra note 3, at 903.
55. THE STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT §§1 & 2 supra note 5, requires inter alia
that all regulations within a given district be uniform and that they be made in accordance
with a comprehensive plan.
56. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 51. See also Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan, 68 HAuv. L. Ray. 1154 (1955).
57. See, e.g., Oka v. Cole, 145 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1962); Aurora v. Burns, 319 II1. 84, 149
N.E. 784 (1925). See generally Haar, supra note 56.
58. 145 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1962).
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conformity with surrounding uses is not fatal to an ordinance which has an
otherwise valid basis.59 Reaffirming the "fairly debatable" rule,6o the Oka court
stated that the validity of a zoning ordinance rests solely upon whether it is
arbitrary and capricious.0 1 However, where the use is consistent with the
policies articulated by the plan and meets all other requirements of a valid
zoning enactment, conformity with the plan has been satisfied.62
Zoning ordinances are traditionally evaluated on an individual basis. This
individual review of spot zoning allegations has created a plethora of diverse
decisions which upon analysis fails to disclose an operative definition of spot
zoning. 3 The wide range of decisions on factually similar situations appears
to be the product of almost personal judicial opinions regarding the compatibility of various uses. Thus, the term, spot zoning, appears to be a word
of art uttered by a court to strike down a zoning ordinance it finds offensive.
Such an ill defined concept should not be the basis of a blanket prohibition
64
of conditional zoning ordinances.
ULTRA VIRs
One of the strongest arguments against conditional zoning, the lack of
statutory authority, has been overlooked by most courts which have examined
conditional ordinances. A zoning authority has no inherent power to zone6 5
and absent a delegation of such police power by the state, a local government
is without authority to enact zoning ordinances. 66 In Allred v. City of Raleigh,
the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the ultra vires rationale to in59. Id. at 235.
60. The "fairly debatable" rule originated with the Supreme Court's use of that language
in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). Florida courts have
developed the rule to the point that one who seeks to challenge a zoning ordinance must show
by substantial evidence that the ordinance is arbitrary and capricious beyond fair debate.
See, e.g., Oka v. Cole, 145 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1962); Hartnett v.Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 1.
61. 145 So. 2d at 235.
62. See Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1091, 333 N.E.2d 731, 733
2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
(App. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 65 Ill.
63. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, §§5.08-5.19; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 649.
64. See Haar supra, note 56, at 1166-70.
65. See J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §237 (1911).
Under "Dillon's Rule" municipal corporations generally have only those powers expressly
delegated to them by the state. However, "Dillon's Rule" may be inapplicable in some
jurisdictions due to home rule powers acts which typically provide that municipalities have
all powers save those specifically withdrawn by statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § §166.01-.042
(1973). See also FLA. CONSr. art. VIII §2(b). "Municipalities shall have governmental corporate
and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government . . . and may
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law." Id.
A detailed discussion of the effects of Florida's Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, FLA.
STAT. §§166.01-.042, is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of this aspect of
Florida law see Comment, Municipal Powers in Florida: By Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 597 (1973). For an overview of municipal home rule powers
in the United States see Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10
WM. & MARY L. REv. 269 (1969).
66. See also Comment, supranote 3, at 905.
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validate a zoning amendment which would have allowed the construction of a
high-rise apartment complex in a residential area. 7 Although the amendment
changed the classification of the affected parcel to one allowing many different
uses, conditions in the ordinance specifically limited use of the parcel to the
proposed project. The court construed the state's enabling act to require that
all uses permitted by a particular zoning classification be made available to
property bearing that classification.4 8 Therefore, in enacting the amendment
the zoning authority had acted beyond the scope of the authority conferred
upon it by the act.
A different result was reached by the New York Court of Appeals in
Church v. Town of Islip. ° In Church, the zoning authority granted a rezoning
request subject to certain conditions imposed to ameliorate the adverse effects
of the change upon contiguous properties. The court held that because a valid
basis existed for the rezoning absent the conditions and the conditions were
designed to minimize the impact of the proposed use, no valid reason existed
to invalidate the ordinance.70 A similar result was reached by the Mississippi
Supreme Court where a rezoning ordinance was conditioned upon provision
of a minimum number of parking spaces.71 Since the local government could
have conditioned a building permit for the proposed project upon the same
provision, the court found that the alternative use of the zoning power was
valid 7 2 Thus, these cases appear to say that a zoning ordinance should not be
invalidated as ultra vires, merely because- they are conditional, where an otherwise valid basis for the ordinance exists.
5
where a
Another approach was used in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento,"
California appellate court held that the state enabling 4 act was merely a
framework for standardization of local zoning ordinances. Thus, the act did
not constitute an absolute enumeration of the permissible forms such ordinances
might take.7 5 It has also been suggested that such authority might be inferred
from the power to grant variances and special exceptions subject to conditions.76 Indeed, in jurisdictions where authority for special exceptions and
variances is implied by the courts, authority for conditional zoning has also
67. 277 N.E. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
68. Id. at 536, 178 S.E.2d at 435.
69. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
70. Id. at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
71. Yates v. Mayor & Com'rs of Jackson. 244 So. 2d 724 (Miss. 1971).
72. Id. at 726. The court looked to an extrinsic source, the local building code ordinance,
to imply authorization for the zoning authority to impose the conditions incident to its
zoning powers. Whether the zoning authority could impose conditions via the zoning power

not authorized under such an extrinsic source is not clear from the opinion. Lewis v. Jackson,
184 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1966) seems to indicate not. In Lewis, the court, while not directly
ruling on a conditional zoning issue, stated that conditions sought to be imposed by the
zoning authority constituted a clear indication that the rezoning was improper. Id. at 388.
73.

275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).

74. Id. at 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77. The court said, "[s]ilence on conditional zoning
is not a denial of power... The practice must find its own justification as an appropriate
exercise of the local police power." Id.
75.
76.

Id., 79 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
Id.
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been implied. 7 However, where express statutory authority exists to enact
conditional variances and special exceptions but not conditional zoning
ordinances, it may be argued that the state legislature considered delegating
the power to conditionally zone to local governments and rejected it.78
REvERTER CLAUSES
A final objection to conditional zoning is that many such ordinances
contain reverter clauses. 79 Such clauses purport to accomplish a rezoning to
the original classification upon failure of the petitioner or his successor in
interest to comply with the conditions attached to the ordinance.8 0 Since an
automatic reversion would presumably violate due process considerations, the
ordinance would be invalidated in its entirety as being procedurally unsound.,"
At least one court has adopted such a view toward reverter clauses and yet approved the concept of conditional zoning.82 The court characterized the reversion, whether automatic or enforced by an administrative board, as a forfeiture rather than a land-use regulatory decision.8 3 Therefore, the ordinance,
84
so conceived, was held to constitute an invalid exercise of the police power.
Other courts have merely declared the reverter a nullity, enforcing the rest
of the ordinance. 85 Still others have interpreted the reverter clause to require
compliance with the same procedural requirements of any zoning enactment
I
thus finding them acceptable methods of enforcement.8 6
In Bucholz v. City of Omaha,87 a conditional zoning amendment provided
that if any covenants to the amendment were breached the city could rezone
the property to its prior classification.88 Upholding the ordinance against a
due process challenge, the Bucholz court noted that if a valid basis existed the
city could rezone the property whether the covenants were breached or not.8 9
However, the court stated that breach of the covenants alone would not
77.

78.
79.
80.
process
breach
see FLA.

See Henning, supra note 10, at 646-47.

Id. at 647.
Id. at 649.
Id. Henning states that the major objection to these clauses is that they violate due
by accomplishing a reversion to the prior zoning classification without notice upon
of the conditions. For typical notice requirements attendant to zoning enactments
STAT.

§166.041 (1978).

81. Presumably property owners are always entitled to notice and fair public hearing
to contest zoning enactments by virtue of the due process clause of The Constitution. This
entitlement must apply to all affected property owners and not just the owner of the property
directly affected by the ordinance. Thus, an argument that the petitioner had waived his
rights to notice and hearing would necessarily fail as he would not have the power to waive
his neighbor's right. See Henning, supra note 10, at 659.
82. Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Ct. App.
1969).
83. Id. at 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
84. Id. That is, one based upon concepts of forfeiture.
85. See, e.g., Bucholz v. Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
86. See, e.g., Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
87. 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
88. Id. at 873, 120 N.W.2d at 277.
89. Id. at 874, 120 N.W.2d at 278.
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constitute a sufficient basis for a rezoning.90 Effectively, the court held the,
reverters to be mere surplusage. 91.
One court has expressly condoned reverter clauses, analogizing to the
authority of zoning boards of adjustment to impose reasonable time limits
within which work necessitating the grant of a variance or special exception
must be initiated or completed.02 However, this court also interpreted the reverter as part and parcel of the ordinance and, as such, governed by the same
procedural requirements for enactment of any zoning ordinance. 93 Thus, in
that jurisdiction, the reverter is relegated to little more than evidence of the
intention of the zoning authority to rezone the property to its original classi-,
fication if the conditions are breached.94 It should be noted that such a result
is indistinguishable from that reached in Buchol.

95

Arguably a mere breach

of the conditions would not constitute a valid basis for rezoning and absent a
valid basis the zoning authority could not rezone the property a second time.96
SUPORT FRoM P.U.D.'s

The planned unit development (P.U.D.), the latest approach to achieving
flexibility in land use regulations,97 is subject to many of the criticisms directed
at conditional zoning, such as spot zoning, ultra vires and undue influence. 98
Substitution of flexibility, variety and creativity for the monotonous iteration'
of traditional Euclidean zoning is the hallmark of the P.U.D. 99 Although many
P.U.D.'s provide for a mix of uses within the district in an effort to provide
supporting commercial services in cose proximity to residential units, some
P.U.D.'s are limited to specific use classes.10° The P.U.D. concept of utilizing
90. Id.
91. Id. If breach of the covenants could not form the basis for a rezoning, then arguably,
the covenants were mere surplusage.
92. Goffinet v. County of Christian, 65 Ill. 2d 40, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
93. Id. at 43, 357 N.E.2d at 445.
94. If the reverter was construed to require compliance with the notice provisions of
the state enabling act, then the reversion of the property to its prior zoning classification
would require a formal zoning amendment with public hearings and proper notice. Arguably
the zoning authority could do this anyway. See Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969). See also note 96, infra and accompanying text. Cf.
Bucholz v. Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
95. In Bucholz the reverter was held to constitute an improper basis for rezoning. Thus,
if all zoning must have a valid basis it appears to make little difference whether a reverter
clause is declared invalid as long as they are severable from the ordinance. If they neither
constitute a valid basis for rezoning nor destroy the ordinance by their presence, they serve
little more than an evidentiary function.
96. Rezoning not based upon a valid consideration would violate the mandate of Village
of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
97. See Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory
and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 47 (1965); Comment, Planned Unit
Development, 35 Mo. L. Rrv. 27 (1970).
98. See notes 30-60 supra and accompanying text. See generally, Comment, note 97 supra.
99. See Comment, note 97 supra, at 27; Comment, .Rezoning and Planned Unit Development in Florida, 3 SThMsoN INTRA. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, Rezoning];
MODEL LAND DE.LopmENT CODE §2-210 (1975).
'100. See note 99 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss5/5

12

Battle: The Validity of Conditional Zoning: A Florida Perspective
tUNVZVtRSItY

OF FLOIDiA LAW RE'IEW

(Vol. XXXI

density zoning' 1' in lieu of traditional lot size and building setback line requirements allows the developer to cluster his units by requiring only that
a prescribed overall density and open space ratio is maintained.10 2 Developers
are thereby encouraged to engage in creative development which better utilizes
the land and results in more common open space.
The ordinance creating a P.U.D. classification generally sets forth only
general guidelines for development. 0 3 Once such a classification has been
created it may be applied to various tracts within the zoning authority's jurisdiction, 0 4 or it may constitute a floating zone,10 5 awaiting the petition of a
landowner before it is applied to his parcel. 06 If the P.U.D. classification is
immediately made applicable to land within the jurisdiction that land may
bear the classification outright or the P.U.D. classification may constitute a
special exception within some other classification.07 However, regardless of
the method by which the classification is applied to a parcel, the P.U.D. classification requires that the landowner negotiate with the zoning authority for
approval of specific development plans.108 Once a specific master plan for the
project is approved that plan becomes the zoning ordinance for the affected
parcel. 09 Any substantial deviation from the approved master plan requires
further approval by the local zoning authority." 0 Thus, P.U.D. classifications
create districts in which conditional zoning is permitted. However, the desirability of P.U.D.'s does not confirm their validity as a land-use tool.
As a relatively new approach to land-use regulation, and undoubtedly because many developers and landowners approve of P.U.D.'s,"'i the concept
101. Density zoning involves setting maximum density and minimum open space requirements. The developer is allowed to place the units all in one corner or spread them out
on the tract as long as he maintains the density and open space requirements. See generally
Krasnowiecki, supra note 97.
102. See Comment, supra note 97, at 27-28; MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, notes
§2-210 (1975).

103.

MODEL LAND DEvELOPMENT CODE,

supra note 99, (2) provides: "Special development

permits may be granted for planned unit development, including combinations of land uses
within the project area, and may be based upon site planning criteria relating to the
project as a whole rather than to individual parcels ... ."Id.
104. E.g., Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968) (P.U.D.
ordinance and ordinance applying it to specific parcel enacted same day).
105. E.g., Hillsborough County, Florida, Zoning Regulations, §19, December 21, 1966,
as amended June 23, 1971. Hillsborough County's P.U.D., called "C-U" or Community
Unit District, is not applicable to any parcel until specifically requested by the landowner.
106. Id. But see Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Lower Gwynedd Twp., 401 Pa.
211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
107. See Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1975) (P.U.D. available through special exception).
108. See generally MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, supra note 99, Note 217; Kraznowiecki, supra note 97.
109. Any change in the master site plan generally requires approval of the zoning
authority. Development of a parcel to which an approved master plan is applicable is
governed by the approved master plan and not by an ordinance. Amendments are made
to that plan and not to the zoning authority's zoning ordinances. See Krasnowiecki, supra
note 97, at 55.
110. Id.
111. This is amply demonstrated by the number of cases involving developers seeking
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has seldom been subject to attack. 1 2 The seminal case of Cheney v. Village 2
at New Hope, Inc.,
' addressed many of the criticisms of the P.U.D. The
P.U.D. ordinance in Cheney was attacked as constituting spot zoning," 4 vesting
too much discretion in the zoning authority, being ultra vires and failing to
conform to the comprehensive plan."1 5 Reversing the trial court's invalidation
of the ordinance, Pennsylvania's highest court found implied authority for
such an ordinance in the state zoning enabling act."- Finding that the enabling
act permitted a wide range of uses to be permitted within a single district,
the court disposed of the "too much discretion" contention by holding that
the ordinance contained guidelines for negotiation between the developer and
the planning commission which it could not abrogate." 7 Further, the court
ruled that the P.U.D. ordinance was a proper method for revising the comprehensive plan." 8 Moreover, since the P.U.D. would not detrimentally alter the
essential character of the neighborhood, no charge of spot zoning could be
sustained." 9 Where jurisdictions adopt the reasoning of the Cheney court,
otherwise valid P.U.D. zoning ordinances will not be struck down for requiring
negotiation of development plans between the zoning authority and the-developer if valid guidelines for the negotiations are set forth by the ordinance.120
In addition, due to the common criticisms directed at both P.U.D.'s and
conditional zoning,' 2 1 in jurisdictions where P.U.D.'s are permitted, their
22
validity will lend support for the validity of conditional zoning.
Since P.U.D.'s are based upon a policy of allowing developers to use in
novative approaches in combining building types and uses in a manner
generally prohibited by detailed predeterminations of conventional Euclidean
zoning, they are generally available only for relatively large tracts of land.
Owners of small tracts of land and developers with insufficient financial resources to acquire large tracts of land are precluded from enjoying the benefits
the various P.U.D. classifications. E.g., American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Norris, 368
So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979); Miami Beach v. Breitbart, 358 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1978); Barrie v. Kitsap County, 84 Wash. 2d 579, 527 P.2d 1377 (1975). If the public were not
happy with P.U.D.'s they would not purchase properties in them and arguably the developers
would not go to court seeking to obtain or retain P.U.D. zoning.
112. See Comment, Rezoning, supra note 99, at 10-12.
113. 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
114. Id. at 626-37, 241 A.2d at 81-86.
115. Id. at 635-39, 241 A.2d at 86-87. See PA. STAT. ANN. 53 §48201 (Purdon).
116. 429 Pa. 629-33, 241 A.2d at 83-84.
117. Id. at 631-33, 241 A.2d at 84.
118. Id.
119. Where the ordinance sets forth guidelines to govern the negotiations the ordinance
should be less open to attack as vesting too much discretion in the zoning board. Cf.
Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). (holding that the discretion of administrative agencies must be constrained by guidelines in order to prevent exercises of
unbridled discretion).
120. See notes 31-118 supra and accompanying text setting forth the arguments against
conditional zoning. Also see note 97-99 supra and accompanying text which suggests that
conditional zoning criticisms have been applied to P.U.D.'s.
121. See notes 108 & 109 supra and accompanying text where it is argued that P.U.D.s

are districts wherein conditional zoning is permitted.
122.

See Comment, sura note 97, at 30.
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of negotiated land-use restrictions available to P.U.D. developers. In addition,
where significant development has already taken place, the surrounding
property owners may be denied the benefit of a proposed use which would
12
have been allowed if the area had originally been developed as a P.U.D. 3
Thus, unless a large tract in a developed area is acquired for redevelopment
the possibility of P.U.D. zoning will not allow a developed area a beneficial
mix of uses. 12 4 However, conditional zoning could be applied to achieve the
same resulting mix of uses that would have resulted from original development of the area as a P.U.D.
Since Cheney, several jurisdictions have passed legislation specifically
authorizing zoning authorities to enact P.U.D. enabling ordinances 12 and
others have condoned P.U.D.'s via judicial fiat.126 Florida's position on the
concept, however, is unclear. 27 Although the Florida enabling act does not
address P.U.D.'s

28

and no Florida court has directly dealt with the question,

29
many cases involving P.U.D.'s have been dealt with in the Florida courts.1
In every case it appears that the court assumed the validity of the P.U.D.
ordinance involved. 30 This phenomenon is probably due to the fact that most
of the cases involved a landowner seeking the classification for his benefit. 131

123. For example, if a P.U.D. contemplates a mix of uses such as small commercial and
professional buildings within the P.U.D., the development may constitute a small community
in itself. See Comment, Rezoning, supra note 99, at 10. "The ideal P.U.D. would contain
small shopping and professional areas thus creating, in effect, a small community." Id.
Where large areas have been developed as pure residential, the beneficial mix of uses
may be difficult to obtain without running afoul of "spot zoning" or creating hardships
upon any proposed commercial use. Reasonable use of conditional zoning can allow the
injection of such uses into established residential neighborhoods without the destruction of
the neighborhood's character by permitting conditions which ameliorate the adverse effects
of the use on immediately contiguous properties. Thus, through use of conditional zoning
established residential areas may be converted into P.U.D.'s where desirable.
124. P.U.D. zoning is of little benefit to an already developed area in which the beneficial
mix of uses found in a P.U.D. is desired.
125. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §19-2829(b) (Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. §40:55-54 (1967);
See also N.Y. TOWN LAW §§270-282 (1965).
126. See, e.g., Barrie v. Kitsap County, 84 Wash. 2d 579, 527 P.2d 1377 (1975); Orinda
Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
127. See notes 128-133 infra and accompanying text.
9
77). But see, FLA. STAT. §163.205(2) (1977) providing
128. See FLA. STAT. §§163.160-.330 G1
inter alia: "For each district designated for the location of trades, callings, industries, commercial enterprises, residences, or buildings designed for specific uses, regulations may specify
those uses that shall be excluded or subjected to reasonable requirements of a special
nature.... Regulations and district boundaries shall protect, promote, and improve public
health, safety, comfort, order, appearance, convenience, morals and general welfare and shall
be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the districts
and their special suitability for particular uses and with a view to conserving property values
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the area." (emphasis added)
This language could be interpreted as enabling legislation for P.U.D. districts.
129. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Norris, 368 So. 2d 897 (Fla. Ist
D.C.A. 1979); Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Consolo, 279 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973);
Board of County Comm'rs v. Ralston, 284 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).
130. See cases cited at note 129 supra. The validity of the P.U.D. concept was never
addressed.
131. See note 125 supra; R. ANDERSON, note I supra §8.17.
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Where the developer is seeking P.U.D. zoning he will not challenge the
validity of the concept.
However, at least one Florida court has condoned P.U.D.'s in dicta, by
suggesting that a P.U.D. zoning would be appropriate 32 since "[p]ursuit of
approval under [P.U.D.] zoning would allow a proper degree of negotiation
for the protection of interests of the general public consistent with the recognition of the constitutional rights of the landowners.

..

."133

Thus, in light

of the widespread acceptance of P.U.D. zoning and this dicta, it appears that
when the question comes directly before a Florida court the concept will be
upheld.
JURISDICnONA

APPROACHES

34

Commentators note' that the courts of last resort in twelve states have
directly addressed the issue of conditional zoning. 3 5 However, some ;of these
courts actually addressed contract zoning and not conditional zoning. 38 For
example, a Tennessee case, City of Knoxville v. Ambristler,137 is often cited
as having invalidated conditional zoning. 3 8 But Ambristler clearly involved
a determination that the zoning ordinance had been enacted pursuant to a
de facto bargain and sale of the power to zone. 39 Thus, it appears'that the
132. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ralston, 284 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973).
133. Id. at 459.
134. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832.
135. Id. Six have held it valid: State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174
N.W.2d 533 (1970); State ex rel. Myhre v. Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967);
Arkenberg v. Topeka, 197 Kan. 731. 421 P.2d 213 (1966); Bucholz v. Omaha, 174 Neb. 862,
120 N.W.2d 270 (1963); Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118
(1962); Church v. Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960). Five have
held it invalid: Allred v. Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971); Oury v. Greeny, 267
A.2d 700 (R.I. 1970); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Knoxville v. Ambristler,
196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit
Ass'n, 9 NJ. 122, 87 A.2d 819 (1952).
One state has held it valid in one form and invalid in another. See Greenbelt v. Bresler,
248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967) (agreement with advisory planning commission proper);
Baylis v. Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959) (agreement with zoning authority improper). Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832-33.
In addition it appears that conditional zoning has recently been addressed and declared
valid in three additional states: Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Tucson, 23 Ariz. App. 335,
533 P.2d 693 (1975) (public needs created by the new use justified right-of-way exactions
for streets); Haas v. Mobile, 289 Ala. 16, 265 So. 2d 564 (1972) (court noted a requirement
that right-of-ways be dedicated as a condition to zoning was justified to ameliorate traffic
problems resulting from the new use); Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 183 S.E.2d 743 (1971)
(building permit properly revoked where developer failed to construct project in accordance
with conditional zoning agreement provisions).
136. See notes 19-30 supra and accompanying text regarding confusion of these two
terms. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Knoxville v. Ambristler, 196
Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953). See also notes 37-43 supra and notes 162-177 infra and
accompanying text.
137. 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953).
138. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 822-32.
139. See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text descrilbing quid pro quo between the
zoning authority and the zoning petitioner,
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Tennessee court actually invalidated contract zoning as it was not faced with
a conditional zoning case. The most recent Tennessee case in this area is
consistent with this view.'The principal jurisdictions cited as being against conditional zoning are
3
Florida, 14' Maryland 142 and New Jersey.' 4 The case law in each of these
jurisdictions, cited in support of their stated positions, is factually similar,
and in each case the ordinance was struck down.14 4 Courts of these three jurisdictions have held that contracts are improper in zoning processes reasoning
that they constitute an improper delegation of the zoning authority's police
power. 145 In Bayhs v. City of Baltimore,14 6 the Maryland Court of Appeals
dealt with other criticisms of attaching conditions to zoning ordinances stating
that such an ordinance is ultra vires and that zoning based upon a privately
negotiated agreement adversely affects the comprehensive plan. 1 7 In addition,
the court noted that land-use regulations should not be based upon extrinsic
evidence. 48 The latter concern appears rooted in feelings that extrinsic agreements do not provide the requisite amount of notice and predictability due
the public. 1 49 However, in later cases the Maryland court appears to have

approved conditional zoning in another form," 0 thus making their true position
uncertain. In contrast, New Jersey appears firmly entrenched against conditional zoning. 5'
To date the highest courts of at least six states have expressly condoned
conditional zoning in some form. 52 Two of these jurisdictions take the extreme position that conditional zoning which approaches contract zoning is
valid, as long as the agreement is not a bargain and sale of the zoning power.' 53
These courts have directed their attention to the validity of the basis for the

140. See Haymon v. Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1973).
141. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); but see notes 163-209 fnfra and
accompanying text.
142. See Baylis v. Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959). But see Greenbelt v.
Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967).
143. See Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass'n., 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d
319 (1952).
144. All three cases involved contracts in the zoning process and the absence of a valid
basis independent of the conditions.
145. See cases cited notes 135-143 supra.
146. 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
147. Id.
148. Id. Accord, Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
149. 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959).
150. See, e.g., Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967) (valid where agreement is with planning commission for a favorable recommendation rather than a favorable
zoning vote).
151. See Midtown Prop. Inc. v. Madison, 68 N.J. Super, 197, 172 A.2d 40, aft'd, 78 N.J.
Super, 471, 189 A.2d 226 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). But see note 125 infra and accompanying text which shows that New Jersey has passed specific enabling legislation for P.U.D.'s.
152. See cases cited note 135 supra. See also Goflnet v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App.
3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1976).
153. See State ex rel. Myhre v. Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967); Goffinet
v. County of Christian, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (1976).
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zoning ordinance and the propriety of the condition exacted rather than the
form of the ordinance.154
New York was the first jurisdiction to utilize such an analysis. 55 Although
the court of appeals acknowledged that contractual legislation is illegal, 58 it
found no inherent problems in a zoning amendment that was conditioned upon
the owner's recordation of restrictive covenants. Looking beyond the mere
existence of the conditions, the court examined the propriety and effect of
their presence in the rezoning process. 57 Holding that nothing in the ordinance
would prevent the zoning authority from rezoning the parcel a second time in
the future, the court found that the presence of the conditions did not amount
to a sale or surrender of the town's police power 5 8 Since the conditions were
imposed merely to ameliorate the adverse effects of the project, and the
ordinance was found to benefit the community, the court stated that there
was no justification for invalidating the ordinance. 159 While this approach has
been followed by jurisdictions which placed emphasis upon whether the zoning
ordinance conforms substantially to the comprehensive plan, 160 unique characteristics of the parcel,' 86 the form of the petition,- 2 or the desirability of the
proposed use,163 Florida's position remains unclear.
THE FLORIDA POSITION
The leading Florida case on conditional zoning, Hartnett v. Austin,64 invalidated a zoning ordinance which called for collateral contracts between the
zoning authority and the zoning petitioner.'8 5 Finding that the ordinance had
no valid basis independent of the conditions exacted,166 the court held the
154. The courts focused upon the propriety of the zoning classification granted and
were apparently willing to tolerate a degree of negotiation between the zoning authority and
landowner. See, e.g., cases cited note 153 supra.
155. See Church v. Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
156. Id. at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., cases cited note 153 supra. See also Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Newton,
344 Mass. 428, 435, 183 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1962).
160. See, e.g., Bucholz v. Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
161. See, e.g., Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967).
162. See, e.g., Goffinet v. County of Christian, 30 OlR. App. 3d 1089, 357 N.E.2d 442
(1976). See also R,. ANDERMSON supra note 1, §18.15, discussing New Jersey's "Special Reasons"
standard for variances.
163. 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
164. Id. at 90. (petitioner was to enter collateral contracts with the city for provision
of police protection and lighting).
165. Id. at 89. The court noted that the board expressly found that the rezoning was
not justified without the conditions: "if the need for a change in a zoning ordinance is
'fairly debatable' the decision of the governing authority will be given the benefit of the
doubt." The court further noted that the ordinance expressly recognized the chance was
justifiable only when certain enumerated conditions were Met. Id.
166. Id. The court stated: "The provisions of a municipal ordinance which conditions
its effectiveness upon the necessity for the subsequent execution of a contract with private
parties such as was done in the case at bar cannot be held to provide the degree of clarity
and certainty that is required of municipal legislatio.," id. ;t 88.
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ordinance too vague and uncertain to stand.167 The Hartnett court was not
faced with conditional zoning per se and expressly stated that it was not
critical of the underlying policy of conditional zoning.168 Thus, it apparently
objected only to the method used to effectuate that policy.
Hartnett's progeny are consistent with the above view.16 9 In Herr v. City
of St. Petersburg,170 the city needed railroad depot property for traffic control
improvements. 1 71 The city entered an agreement with the railroad whereby the
city would acquire the depot parcel in exchange for an unspecified parcel in
another location." 2 For the protection of the railroad, the agreement contained
a clause requiring the parcel given to the railroad to be properly zoned for
the railroad's intended use.17 3 A citizen filed suit to have the contract voided
alledging that it constituted an illegal agreement to surrender the zoning
power. 7 4 The Florida Supreme Court sustained the ordinance, holding that
the city would be obligated to zone some parcel for the railroad's use even if
they took the depot parcel by eminent domain. 7 5 Since the agreement stated
that the city would exchange a parcel that was suitable for use as a depot for
the present depot parcel, 7 6 the clause was held to constitute an agreement to
exchange a parcel which was properly zoned and not an agreement to zone
any specific parcel. 7 7 Because there was no evidence of a bargain and sale of
the police power nor an attempt by the city to obtain collateral economic
benefits in consideration for an exercise of the police power, 7 8 the court did
not object to the clause. 7 9
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reached a similar result in
Housing Authority of Melbourne v. Richardson.8 0 In Richardson, the zoning
authority had agreed to alter its zoning scheme to accommodate a public
167.
critical
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 89. The court stated "[tlhis opinion is not to be construed as being adversely
of the policy adopted by appellants in this instance." Id.
See notes 169-237 infra and accompanying text.
114 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1959).
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. at 173.

173. Id. at 172.
174. Id. at 175. The court stated, "[blut we see no reason to vitiate the contract because
of the covenants of the City, made therein, to do what would necessarily be its duty, with
or without such covenants, in order to effectuate the comprehensive over-all plan .... Id.
175. Id. at 173. The court, in effect, held that some parcel in the city would be suitable
for a railroad depot and the city would have to permit that use.
176. Id. at 174. The clause was interpreted as requiring that once the city properly
zoned another parcel for use as a depot the city would be required to deed that parcel to
the railroad. Id.
177. The agreement was merely conceived to allow the city to acquire the necessary
parcel without condemning it. There was no attempt, or intent, to require the city to zone
any specific parcel. In fact, had a suitable parcel owned by the city been already properly
zoned, the city would have exchanged that parcel for the depot property. Id.
178. The court found none of the objections to the agreement that it found present in
Hartnett.See note 165 supra.
179. 196 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967).
180. Id. at 490. The project was federally subsidized and the agreement was necessary
to secure federal funds.
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housing project. 8' The city did not agree to zone a specific parcel of land for
the project's use, .nor to apply a specific land-use classification to the land
surrounding the project. But the city did agree to consider the need for public
housing in exercising its zoning power. 82 Upholding the agreement, the court
held that the need for public housing is a proper consideration upon which
zoning ordinances may be based. 83 The court also noted that the agreement
specifically stated that, in accommodating the project, the city would exercise
zoning power only so far as it was legally empowered. 84
In light of the ,-tartnett dicta, Herr appears to bar only those agreements
to zone involving the seeking of collateral benefits by the zoning authority.8 5
Richardson bars a surrender of the power to zone or zoning based upon an
improper consideration even where the agreement is between two government
agencies. 8 6 Thus, read together, Hartnett, Herr and Richardson seem to establish that a conditional zoning ordinance will be declared invalid only where
the ordinance constitutes a bargain and sale of the zoning power in an effort
to secure collateral benefits,8 7 or is based upon other improper considera89
tion,' or otherwise constitutes a surrender of the zoning power.
Two analogous Florida cases shed considerable light on the status of conditional zoning in Florida and lend support to the above views. The first,
Board of Commissionersv. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co.,'O involved an agreement between the state and the City of Tallahassee. The state planned to

181. Id. at 491.
182. Id. at 492.
183. Id.
184. See notes 167 & 168 supra and accompanying text.
185. The court stated that if the city had agreed to zone a specific parcel, which was
not otherwise suitable for the public housing project, in consideration for federal funding
the agreement would have been invalid. 196 So. 2d at 491.
186. See Herr v. St. Petersburg, 114 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1959) (proper to agree, to exchange
properly zoned parcel and for land sought by zoning authority but improper to agree to
zone any specific parcel); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (collateral contracts
for lighting and police protection).
187. See Hartaett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (where zoning classification is
improper without conditions, any conditions exacted are improper considerations upon which
to base zoning ordinance); Housing Auth. at Melbourne v. Richardson, 196 So. 2d 489 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1967) (provision of low income housing proper consideration upon which to base
zoning, but zoning authority cannot agree to zone a specific parcel as consideration for
Federal funding).
188. See Herr v. St. Petersburg, 114 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1959) (zoning authority may not
surrender its police power by agreeing to zone a specific parcel even where, purpose is to
reduce acquisition cost of a parcel which would otherwise be taken by eminent domain);
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (meaning of a zoning ordinance may not turn
on provisions of subsequent collateral contracts); Housing Auth. of Melbourne v. Richardson,
196 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th D.CA. 1967) (zoning authority may not agree to surrender its
police power for any purpose even where surrender is to another government agency).
189. See New Products Corp. y. North Miami, 241 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970). Also
see notes 190-208, infra and accompanying text.
190. Board of Comm'rs v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1958), cert. quashed, 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1958) (ordinance resulting from agreement of
City of Tallahassee to use zoning power to hold down value of property).
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acquire property in the area of the present Capital Center' 91 and wished to
prevent expensive commercial development on the parcel which the state
would have to condemn at a later date.19 2 Pursuant to the agreement, the City
of Tallahassee enacted zoning regulations restricting the property to residential
uses.1 93 Seven years later, the state began condemnation proceedings and the
landowners attacked the validity of the zoning ordinances while offering
evidence of the value of their land. 194 The record conclusively showed that the
ordinances were the result of the agreement between the state and city in
an attempt to hold down the value of the land. 95 Upon appeal of a judgment
in favor of the property owners, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment holding that the ordinance constituted an improper exercise of the
zoning power. 96 Even though the agreement was between the state and one
of its political subdivisions, the court rejected the notion that the zoning power
could be exercised based upon considerations of economic benefit to the
state.19 7 This holding is consistent with the view that the police power may
not be exercised for the benefit of special interests.1 98
199
The second case, New Products Corporation v. City of North Miami,
involved an agreement wherein New Products Corporation promised to
purchase a parcel zoned for public use from the city and the city agreed to
rezone the parcel for multiple family use.' ° When the city attempted to avoid
the agreement claiming an illegal contract to zone, the purchaser sued for
specific performance. 2 0 1 The trial court held that the covenant to rezone vitiated
the entire contract. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, invalidating
191. Id.
192. The land under the present state capitol building.
193. 108 So. 2d at 75.
194. Id.
195. Id. If commercial zoning was the basis of evaluation the state would have to pay
considerably more than if the land could only be developed for residential purposes. Id. at
76. In addition the use the state intended to make of the property was consistent with the
commercial use sought to be established and thus inconsistent with the residential classification the land carried. It is highly probable that this fact weighed heavily against the state
as it appears that the city had colluded with the state to the economic benefit of both.
Id. at 77.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 87. The court stated: "We have not yet reached the point where the rights
of an individual in the enjoyment of his private property are to be subordinated to the
demands of government except upon payment of just compensation . . . in a fashion
consistent with the requirements of due process of law." Id.
199. The police power must be exercised for the health, safety and welfare of the public.
See J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, FLORIDA LAND USE RESTRICTION §2.02

(1975). Arguably,

the public constitutes all persons within the state. Therefore this case also appears to stand
for the proposition that the zoning power is to be exercised first for the benefit of the
general public within the zoning authority's jurisdiction, with the interests of that segment
of the public outside of the jurisdiction being subordinated. For an excellent discussion of
the geographic scope of a local government's considerations in an exercise of the zoning
power see Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713
(1975).
200. 241 So. 2d 451 (Fla. d D.C.A. 1976).
201. Id. at 451.
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only the covenant to rezone upon the authority of Hartnett and Board of Commissioners, and remanded with directions that specific performance of the
purchase contract, minus the covenant, be granted at the buyer's option.2 0 2
After remand, the buyer purchased the parcel and petitioned to have it rezoned for multiple family use. The petition was denied leaving the property
zoned for public use.203 New Products Corporation challenged the propriety of
the classification in circuit court and the complaint was dismissed. Upon
appeal the Third District Court of Appeal again reversed and remanded to
the trial court with directions that the city rezone the property to a classification consistent with the surrounding multiple family use. 2 0 4 New Products
Corporation is similar to Hartnett in that the New Products Corporation
court apparently felt that the agreement was motivated by the city's desire to
exact a higher price for its property. 205 This desire of the zoning authority to
secure collateral economic benefits, as an incident to the exercise of its zoning
power, was present in Hartnett wherein the authority required that the landowner pay for "additional" police protection.200
While Board of Commissioners did not involve considerations of direct
collateral economic benefit to the zoning authority,207 it did involve such
benefit to another government body.2s Thus, Board of Commissioners and
New Products Corporationsupport only the view that a zoning ordinance or
agreement to zone will be struck down where its basis is rooted in improper
considerations or involves a surrender of the power to zone by the zoning
authority. Absent these concerns, there is nothing in the Hartnett line of cases
to indicate that conditions based upon proper considerations may not be attached to an otherwise valid zoning ordinance 20 9
202. Id. It is unclear why the city decided to breach the purchase agreement. Id.
203. Id. at 451-52. "Clearly, the provision requiring the City to re-zone the property ...
was an illegal covenant." Id. at 451. "However, it was for the benefit of the purchaser and
he had the option to waive this provision .... " Id. at 452.
204. Thus the new owner, New Products Corporation, could not put the property to any
beneficial use due to the public use classification. For a case involving a factually similar
situation see Fred F. French Investing Co. v. New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350
N.E.2d 381 (1976) (ordinance zoning owner's property "Special Park District" which allowed
public use only, held unconstitutional and prior zoning, allowing residential and office
building development, restored).
205. See New Products Corp. v. North Miami, 241 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1970). The
surrounding property was zoned for multiple family and light industrial use. Thus the
court's order did not guarantee multiple family zoning, but did require a rezoning of the
parcel to a beneficial use which was consistent with the existing uses of surrounding
property.
206. This is supported by the fact that the court could have required the city to rezone
the parcel to some classification allowing private use in any event because New Products
could not use the property at all under a public use classification. Herr v. City of St. Petersburg, 114 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1959) utilized similar reasoning to uphold land sales contract
conditioned upon proper zoning, see notes 169-178 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 163-167 supra and accompanying text.
208. The agreement was between the state and the city zoning authority, and was

intended to save the state considerable sums of money when the state began condemnation
proceedings at a later date. See notes 190-199 supra and accompanying text.
209. See notes 160-207 supra and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss5/5

22

Battle: The Validity of Conditional Zoning: A Florida Perspective
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

NEW HOPE FROM

[Vol. XXXI

Griffey?

The most recent Florida case on "conditional zoning," Broward County v.
Griffey,210 may mark the beginning of a new era for "conditional zoning" in
Florida. In Griffey the owner of a tract of land in Broward County petitioned
the zoning board for a change in zoning from T-1 (trailer park classification)
to R4A (planned apartment). 21 After public hearing, the zoning authority
deferred its action pending the execution of several conditions, which included
deeding certain parcels of road right-of-way and giving an option to the
county for the purchase of additional property for road right-of-way purposes
at terms favorable to the county.2 12 Upon compliance with these conditions
the county zoning authority rezoned the property R-4A. However, the landowners never initiated construction of the project.2 13 Two years later, the
county adopted a comprehensive land-use plan and, in accordance with this
plan, rezoned the property to light industrial, a classification which did not
2 4
permit R-4A use. Although the landowners objected to this rezoning at the public hearings
on the plan, they did not file suit contesting the rezoning.- 5 Instead, they
sought return of the deeded parcels, alleging that they had been involuntary
participants to an illegal agreement. 20 The trial court held the contract to be
illegal, entered judgment in favor of the landowners and ordered the county
to return the property. 21 7 The zoning under the comprehensive plan was left
intact.218 Upon appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed,219 holding
22
that the trial court's decision was "unsupported by the facts or the law." 0

210. 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).
211. Id. at 870. See also Brief for Appellant at 1, Broward County v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d
869 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).
212. 366 So. 2d at 870. See also Brief for Appellees at 6-7 Broward County v. Griffey, 366
So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979). The planning commission had unanimously recommended
denial of the rezoning petition. 366 So. 2d at 870.
213. 366 So. 2d 870. "In the period of time following the rezoning the appellees were
apparently unable to come to terms with their contractor. The building was not started ...
Id.
214. Id. "The rezoning occurred approximately two years after the initial rezoning." Id.
215. Id. "The Griffeys did not formally challenge the change of zoning." Id.
216. Id. Rather, "They only requested the County return the land." Id.
217. Id. at 871.
218. Id.
219. Id. Thus the Griffeys lost both their zoning and the land dedicated as an inducement therefore. A New Jersey court reached a similar result in Gregory Manor v. Clifton, 53
N.J. Super. 482, 147 A.2d 595 (1959) in a slightly different fact situation. In Gregory the
landowner dedicated land as an inducement for a zoning petition approval. The city
accepted the land and refused to grant the petition. So strong is the New Jersey courts' disfavor with conditional zoning that it left the parties as they were. Thus, the landowner lost
the land he dedicated and failed to receive the requested zoning.
220. 366 So. 2d at 870. The county argued that the conditions exacted did not affect
the use of the property and thus were permissible as "reasonably conceived to fulfill public
needs emanating from the landowner's proposed use .... " citing Ayres v. City Council of
Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d I (194 9). See Brief for Appellant at 7, Broward County
v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979). Conversations with Mr. Harry A. Stewart,
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In the appellate court's view of the evidence, the landowners were not
forced into the agreement. Rather, the two parties merely came to a mutually
satisfactory agreement. 221 Noting that it was uncontroverted, that the county
needed the parcels to meet the increased traffic flow which would result from
the project, the court characterized the county's requiring the dedication as
reasonable. 222 Finding no bargaining away of the police power, or overreaching
on the part of the county, the Griffey court distinguished Hartnetton the basis
of the collateral contracts involved in that case.223 However, under Hartnett's
reasoning, which invalidated an ordinance because the rezoning was not justifiable, absent the conditions there imposed, the Griffey court's labelling of the
conditions as "reasonable requirements without which [the project] was unI
justified ' 224 is perplexing. 5
Several implicit distinctions, not articulated by the court, may explain the
Grifey court's conclusion. The first is that the conditions in Griffey were in
the nature of subdivision exactions 226 which could have been required without
the conditional zoning ordinance. 227 Second, the Hartnett court stated that
the zoning authority in that case specifically found that the zoning was
without justification absent the 'conditions. 'Third, the Hartnett ordinance
involved an attempt by the city to obtain collateral benefits by enacting an
otherwise improper zoning ordinance. 22 9 The Griffey ordinance, in contrast,
General Counsel for Broward County, July 21, 1979, confirm that appellants position was
that the conditions were in the nature of subdivision exactions.
221. See M66
So. 2d at 871.
222. Id. In conclusion, the court stated: "The County's requirement of adequate traffic
flow to and through the land was a reasonable requirement without which the land was
unsuitable for a high density apartment complex. There was no showing the county exacted
anything from the Griffeys other than would be required of any R-4A zoning classification."
Id.
223. 366 So. 2d at 871.
224. Id.
225. The Hartnett court noted that "the ordinance expressly recognized that the change
was justifiable only: (1)if the Bay Point Wall was built; (2) if there was a 40 foot setback;
(3)if the setback area was landscaped and maintained; (4) if surrounding property owners
were protected against glare and disturbance; and (5) if the property owner paid for police
protection." 93 So. 2d at 89.
226. Subdivision exactions involve conditions, dedications, and fees which are imposed
upon developers as a prerequisite to subdivision approval. The authority of local governments to impose subdivision exactions has generally been upheld. See D. HAGM!AN, URAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw §138 (1975). For an overview of subdivision
exactions see Hanna, Subdivisions: ConditionsImposed by Local Government, 6 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 172 (1966); Johnston Constitutionalityof Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for
a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871 (1967).
227. The polar extremes of jurisdictional views as to what types of subdivision exactions
are permissible may be dearly identified in two cases: Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mt.
Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (restrictive view); Associated Home Builders,
Inc. v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971) (most liberal
view to date). Arguably right-of-way exactions are within the purview of common subdivision
exactions. See note 220 supra which indicates that this was the position of the county.
228. See note 224 supra.
229. Since the Hartnett ordinance had no valid basis independent of the conditions
imposed, the conditions appear to have been "sweeteners" offered in an attempt to obtain
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had a valid basis and the conditions were merely reasonable requirements
intended to minimize any adverse affects the project might have on surrounding property or the community as a whole.230 Further, the only challenge to
the Griffey ordinance was that the conditions constituted illegal exactions
demanded by the county as consideration for a zoning amendment that was
proper without the conditions. 231 It was uncontroverted that the ordinance,
absent the conditions, was valid. 232 Thus, the Griffey court faced only the
question of whether an otherwise valid zoning amendment is rendered invalid
by delaying its enactment pending compliance with reasonable conditions
233
precedent.
The Griffey court's holding that such an ordinance is valid finds support in
Hartnett dicta where, discussing the "fairly debatable" rule 34 and its applicability to the Hartnett ordinance, the court stated that "[i]f the City Commission, after appropriate hearing, had determined that the highest and best
use value of the land had changed from residential to commercial, then the
'fairly debatable' rule might have a sphere of applicability. This was not
235
done."
Relying upon this language it can be concluded that the "fairly debatable"
rule might be applied to sustain an otherwise valid zoning ordinance to which
conditions have been attached. Arguably the Griffey court, faced with just such
an ordinance, has interpreted this language as tacit approval of conditional
zoning. 236 Should this interpretation of Hartnett stand, the inquiry in conditional zoning cases will extend beyond the mere presence of conditions in the
ordinance. Where the conditions are reasonable and the ordinance has a
237
valid basis aside from the conditions, it will be sustained.

an improper zoning ordinance or requested as consideration for one. The requirements
that the landowner pay for maintenance of the setback in conformance with the city's
desires and pay for police protection were especially suspect. See 93 So. 2d at 88.
250. See Brief for Appellant at 7, Broward County v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1979), accord, Church v. Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960)
(rationale adopted). However, arguably the Hartnett ordinance's conditions were intended
to achieve the same end.
231. The validity of the two rezonings of the Griffey's property was not contested. Both
parties framed the issues in their appellate briefs as whether the agreement between them
was valid. See Brief for Appellant, Reply Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellees, Broward
County v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979).
232. 366 So. 2d at 870.
233. See notes 230 and 231 supra.
234. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
235. 93 So. 2d at 89.
236. This can be supported by comparing Brief for Appellant at 7, Broward County v.
Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979) (arguing that reasonable conditions imposed
to fulfill public needs emanating from an otherwise valid use are proper) with the following
language from the Griffey opinion: "The County's requirement of adequate traffic flow to
and through the land was a reasonable requirement .... " 366 So. 2d at 871, in light of the
Hartnett dicta stating that the court was not overly critical.
237. Under Griffey it appears that a zoning authority may properly attach conditions to
an otherwise valid zoning ordinance if the conditions are not significantly different from
subdivision exactions it might exact from other landowners under similar circumstances.
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CONDITIONAL ZONING
CONCLUSION

With the general trend toward more flexibility in land-use controls, conditional zoning offers a viable solution for areas where land-use is in flux and
where conflicting uses are contiguous. Conditional zoning can play a significant
role in balancing the interests of the rezoning petitioner and neighboring
property owners. Further, it provides a vehicle for airing and debating the
desires of all interested parties and accommodating the greatest possible
number of these desires in the end result. Finally, fears of undue influence or
improper considerations are largely misplaced, and the evils of "contract
zoning" are definitionally precluded.
The case for granting zoning officials this much needed discretion to use
conditional zoning as a flexibility device is bolstered by our experience with
the P.U.D. P.U.D.'s have encouraged creative development and have allowed
the tailoring of land-use regulations to the unique qualities of individual sites.
The concept has worked well, with challenges few and generally unsuccessful.
While no Florida court has directly examined the validity of the P.U.D., its
use in Florida is widespread and it appears the concept will be upheld. Like
the P.U.D., conditional zoning recognizes the impracticability of prospective
consideration of all possible factors affecting land use within a zoning jurisdiction. Through conditional zoning, lengthy and detailed ordinances to create
special use districts for every parcel requiring special considerations can be
avoided.
The authority of zoning officials to negotiate and impose conditions on
variances and special exceptions is well settled. Similar discretion is exercised by
these officials during the approval of P.U.D. master plans and by building inspectors in issuing building permits. If such discretion is to be condoned in
those instances, little reason can be advanced to preclude its exercise in the
enactment of zoning ordinances.
MAXWELL G. BATrLE, JR.
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